The footnotes to this book make interesting historical reading. Most of the references to innovation are to works from the early 1990s and most of the references to studies of risk are to books and articles that appeared quite recently. Innovation studies probably came out of concern with interest in new technologies and how they were validated; interest in risk possibly comes from evidence based medicine. There is a huge body of work by experts on risk. In recent years, however, a rich alternative literature has grown up discussing the ways in which risk has become restricted to a technical term or defined only scientifically and thus excludes concerns about safety and danger expressed by ordinary citizens. These issues are helpfully touched on by the authors in their introduction, which is much more broad and useful than the common, ritual recitation of contents. For the most part, the fifteen essays in *The risks of medical innovation* show awareness of these concerns although with varying degrees of engagement.

Almost all the studies are case histories and most are from the twentieth century. The range is impressive. After a chapter by Ulrich Tröhler on a number of innovations since 1850 there are essays on tuberculin, X-rays, radiation, drug treatment for hypertension, hormones, the pill, cancer trials, biotechnology and thalidomide. Four essays in particular took my attention and for three different reasons. Christian Bonah\'s study of the introduction of BCG vaccine into France and Germany between the wars is a splendid account of the role of the expert and authority in defining risk. What Bonah nicely shows is how, in quite different ways, statistical, laboratory and clinical authority were drawn upon or refuted in different contexts as the objective basis for the efficacy or otherwise of the vaccine. The strength of Thomas Schlich\'s paper on fracture care is that it explores the cosmologies of the different authorities who claim to be the legitimate identifiers of risk. He discusses two groups of surgeons: those who promoted fracture plating and saw themselves as scientific, and those who promoted traditional traction and described surgery as an art. Behind these representations, Schlich argues, were defences of two social formations: on the one hand the democratic and on the other the personal and hierarchical. From this perspective, different accounts of risk become ultimately incommensurable.

Two papers on apparently dissimilar subjects explicitly shared a dimension that the rest of the volume only hints at. Ian Burney\'s chapter on anaesthesia and surgical risk in Britain in the nineteenth century, and Silke Bellanger and Aline Steinbrecher\'s study of brain death in Switzerland 1960--2000 might not, at first sight, seem obvious candidates for twinning. Yet a moment\'s reflection reveals them both to deal with a state that is a dangerous border zone where uncertainty can prevail. After the introduction of chloroform anaesthesia, proponents and opponents argued over the ways in which perceptions of risk of death when the agent was used changed the actual risk, since anxiety and fear were held to be predisposing causes of chloroform\'s effects. In short, they came to radically different conclusions about the risk of employing the drug. In Switzerland, in recent history, doctors tried to establish objective criteria for brain death to minimize the risk of removing an organ for transplantation from someone who might otherwise recover. Gradually it became apparent that the communication of risk between medical staff and relatives was constitutive of the perception of that risk itself. The interesting question is whether the psychological constitution of objective risk demonstrated in these two important essays is an anomaly because of the grey area they deal with or, in much more subtle ways, is present in all risk assessment.
